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EXPORT SUBSIDIES OF THE CARIBBEAN BASIN AND
A PROPOSED REVISION OF INTERNATIONAL RULES
REGARDING COUNTERVAILING DUTIES
Dr. Bryant D. Smith*
The countries of the Caribbean Basin, in common with other LDCs,
face the constant threat of countervailing duties being imposed on a
variety of their exports to the United States. The possibility of revising
the internal rules of the game in the area of countervailing duties has
been advised by a number of interested parties and is presently being
considered at the Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN) in Geneva. The
developing countries have been trying, with considerable resistance from
some of the developed countries, to obtain special rules which would
apply to them in this area. In order to understand the problems that the
LDCs face and the viability of proposals for differential treatment, it is
necessary to consider the context in which all of the issues are being.
considered. This paper will first examine the fundamental issues under
discussion, then the problems which arise for Caribbean Basin countries,
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and finally, possible rules to resolve the conflict for developing countries
of the Basin.
BACKGROUND

AND ISSUES

Countervailing duties are special duties imposed on imports in
addition to the normal tariff, which are designed to offset in value export
subsidies which are granted by a foreign country. Such duties are
imposed under the justification of either protecting the integrity of
international comparative advantage in trade or the tariff structure of the
importing country. In order to insure uniform rules in the area of
countervailing duties, article VI was incorporated in the GATT,' but as
time passed, both the United States and its principal trading partners
became dissatisfied with distinct aspects of the provisions. The United
States became disgruntled with the provision which excluded rebates of
consumption or so-called "indirect taxes" on exports from the definition
of an illegal bounty or subsidy while including income and profit-type
"direct tax" rebates. At the time this paper was drafted, it was the
prevailing wisdom of economists that direct taxes such as income and
profit taxes were not included in the price of products, whereas indirect
taxes such as sales taxes, excise taxes and value-added taxes were shifted
forward. Thus, it was reasoned that a rebate of indirect taxes did not
benefit exports. Over time, the validity of the distinction was
increasingly questioned, but the rule did not change. Since the Europeans
had come to rely more heavily upon indirect taxes in their tax structures
than the United States, the Americans felt that they were put at an unfair
disadvantage.
On the other side, the Europeans faced a disadvantage vis-a-vis the
United States under the injury requirement of the GAT. Under article
VI, countervailing duties were to be imposed only if subsidized imports
caused material injury to the domestic industry of like products of the
importing country. When the GATr was implemented, however, a
grandfather clause was agreed to which allowed signatory countries to
2
maintain inconsistent national legislation which pre-dated the GATT.
The United States had a prior countervailing duty law without an injury
requirement and it chose to invoke the grandfather clause and apply
countervailing duties without a show of injury to U.S. industry.

1. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S.
194, T.I.A.S. No. 1700 (1948).
2. Protocol of Provisional Application of The General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, 55 U.N.T.S. 308.
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While this situation left both sides somewhat dissatisfied, there was
no serious move to reconcile the conflict until 1977, when a U.S. customs
court reversed a long-standing administrative practice of the U.S.3
Treasury Department. The court in Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States
ruled that certain Japanese consumption tax rebates were illegal bounties
and grants within the meaning of the countervailing duty law of the
United States. The case prompted a charge of foul play by developed
trading partners of the United States which saw the decision as upsetting
the former balance, and serious discussions began at the MTN regarding
the possibility of a modification of the international rules.
CARIBBEAN BASIN PRACTICES

The Zenith decision and aftermath have created a most propitious
opportunity for the developing countries to undertake changes in the
rules. The developing countries, including a number of those from the
Caribbean Basin, have faced a problem which is of a nature different
from that of the developed countries. A number of them undertook
domestic programs to substitute local production for imports in order to
solve balance of payments problems and accelerate economic development. The policy provoked situations in which high import barriers were
imposed to protect the new producers, and financial exchange rates
became increasingly lower than those which would have prevailed in a
free trade environment. The result was to distort the true comparative4
advantage of developing countries to the disadvantage of their exports.
Gradually, some of the countries came to recognize that importsubstitution policies had gotten out of hand and in many cases were
exacerbating rather than solving balance of payments problems. The
response to this was a distinct shift in the mid-sixties and early seventies
to export promotion strategies which were designed to stimulate new
exports of nontraditional, generally semimanufactured articles principally to developed country markets. This change of policy could have
been best accomplished through devaluation and an overall reduction of
import duties which would have decreased input costs of exports and
increased the profitability of exporting relative to other activities. Local

3. Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 430 F. Supp. 242 (Cust. Ct. 1977).
4. See, e.g., D. Schydlowsky, The Subsidy and Countervailing Duties
Negotiations and the Developing Countries, Paper presented at the Seminar on
the Multilateral Trade Negotiations and the Developing Countries of the Agency
for International Development and Foreign Service Institute, February 22, 1977,
and Perez, Export Subsidies in Developing Countries and the GATT, 10 J.W.T.L.
529 (1976).
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producers created by the import-substitution policy, however, were often
sufficiently entrenched to prevent such change which would have opened
them to import competition and would have drawn investment away from
them to export activities. Consequently, the countries frequently adopted
less efficient mechanisms in the form of export subsidies, often on an ad
hoc basis, in favor of specific products.
The types of subsidies one finds are remarkably similar among
developing countries and generally illegal under GATT and U.S.
countervailing duty rules. A sample of the more common subsidy
practices, all of which have been or are currently being used in some of
the Caribbean Basin countries, would include:
1. Custom duty exemptions on imports of machinery and equipment
used for the production of exports;
2. Cash rebates or certificates whose face value is a percentage of
the domestic value added or export price of a product, or, is a percentage
of increased profits from exports compared to the prior year, which
certificates are freely negotiable and accepted by the government to
satisfy income and profits tax liabilities;
3. Government-supported loans for export production and export
financing at below-market interest rates;
4. Government assistance in export credit insurance costs;
5. Special depreciation allowances related to export performance;
and
6. More favorable exchange rates for export transactions.
While the above practices are not always the most efficient mechanisms
and can create some of the same problems that excessive importsubstitution had experienced, the governments have felt assured of
adopting the best measures possible to achieve their goal of export
expansion, given the political constraints they face. When countervailing
duties were applied to such subsidized exports, the developing countries
somewhat justifiably complained that such subsidies merely correct
distortions to comparative advantage rather than create them.
The situation was ameliorated, in certain respects, by the fact that
such arguments were sometimes unofficially recognized by administrators of countervailing duty codes in a number of cases and enforcement
was not always strict.
THE STAGE FOR REFORM

The world recession of the 1970s and the 1974 Trade Act of the United
States, induced a number of changes. Prior to the Trade Act, the U.S.
customs courts had given the U.S. Treasury Department, which
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administers the countervailing duty law, a fair amount of discretion in
interpreting and applying countervailing duties. The appellate customs
court, for example, turned back a challenge by a U.S. manufacturer to a.
Treasury Department negative determination of countervailing duties,
ruling that such manufacturers were not empowered to compel judicial
review by customs courts in such cases. 5 This broad discretion was
subsequently limited, however, by both judicial decision 6 and the Trade
Act of 19747 which allowed judicial challenge by U.S. manufacturers of
such negative determinations. With the world recession increasing
protectionist pressures and with the modification of the countervailing
duty code by the Trade Act, the countervailing duty law became a more
useful instrument against developing countries, and the Zenith case set
the stage for reform.
Several factors, however, worked against the broad reform that was
needed. First, the rules of international trade have historically been made
by the developed countries to facilitate trade among themselves.
Secondly, a genuine reform of the rules is least likely in a protectionist
environment, especially a reform which would give preferential rules in
favor of some countries. Thus, the Zenith case created somewhat of a rare
opportunity because it suddenly appeared to throw out the established
norms for trade among the developed nations and raised the possibility of
U.S. protectionists using countervailing duties as an instrument against
a wide variety of trade goods of the developed countries. Reform of the
rules of the game now seemed the most prudent of all the alternatives and
it raised the possibility that the developed countries might be able to get
in some special rules to take into account their special circumstances.
A good part of the drama and suspense of the situation, as well as a
part of the momentum for reform, was lost when the appellate customs
court overturned the lower court decion in Zenith.8 The drive for reform
has not died, however, and revision is still possible, and discussions
regarding reform still proceed at Geneva. Given the increased availability
of countervailing duties in the United States as a protectionist instrument
and the widespread use of export subsidies by developing countries, it still

5. United States v. Hammond Lead Products, Inc., 440 F.2d 1024 (C.C.P.A.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
6. National Milk Producers Federation v. Schultz, 372 F. Supp. 745 (D.D.C.
1974).
7. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1301 et. seq.
8. United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 562 F.2d 1203 (C.C.P.A. 1977). On
appeal the Supreme Court affirmed the CCPA thus denying Zenith's request that
countervailing duties be imposed and confirming the propriety of Treasury's
traditional practice, - U.S. -, 98 S. Ct. 2441 (1978).
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remains an important issue. The success of the developing countries in
getting special rules for application to their subsidized exports will
depend upon several things. They will need to ensure that differential
rules are formulated which will, in fact, confer a true benefit in their
favor. They have learned that the differential treatment they have
received under the GSP has been so circumscribed by special rules that
the benefits have been more modest than they had hoped. 9 At the same
time, however, their proposals will have to be sufficiently realistic so as to
be politically palatable to the developed countries.
One proposal which has been discussed and which seeks to strike a
balance between both of these somewhat conflicting necessities is that of
differential injury requirements for developing and developed countries'
subsidized exports. The specifics of a proposal of this type can be
suggested by borrowing from GATT, and various U.S. statutes and
administrative practices in the area of trade. Basically, traditional escape
clause requirements could be applied by developed countries to imports of
subsidized goods from developing countries while applying traditional
countervailing duty norms to subsidized goods from other developed
countries. The issue of direct versus indirect tax exemptions would be
irrelevant in the case of LDCs since the issue would be whether the
domestic industry of the developed country suffered the requisite injury
from subsidized imports from an LDC, irrespective of the form of the
subsidy.
Injury Requirement'°
Under an escape clause-type rule, it could be required that subsidized
imports from LDCs be imported in such increased quantities as to cause
"serious injury" to the domestic industry of the developed country before
applying countervailing duties, whereas the test for subsidized imports
from other developed countries would be the present GATT rule, requiring
that illegally subsidized imports cause "material injury" to the competitive domestic industry.
Causation Requirement
In addition to the above element, it would be necessary to show that
the subsidized imports were the "major cause" of the serious injury, viz.,

9. See R. Baldwin, & T. Murray, MTN Tariff Reductions and Developing
Country Trade Benefits Under the GSP (mimeo.) (1976).
10. Under U.S. trade legislation, injury determinations are generally made by
the International Trade Commission. See Anti-Dumping Act, 1921, 19 U.S.C. § 160,
and Trade Act of 1974 § 331(a).
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the causation of injury by the disputed imports have to be a cause greater
than all other causes combined." The GATT norm for application to
developed countries would continue to be that the imports be the
"principal cause" of injury, implying only that it be more important than
any one other of a variety of possible causes. Judging from past U.S.
application of these criteria, the causation element would probably
produce more differential treatment than any other element.
An added requirement could be borrowed from antidumping rules and
included as part of a causation requirement. In some U.S. antidumping
cases, the ITC has ruled that it could be presumed that no causation
existed because the offending imports did not represent a sufficiently
large portion of U.S. consumption. 12 This interpretation could be
formalized by allowing an LDC or group of LDCs to subsidize a product
to a developed country without fear of countervailing duties until such
product reached a certain proportion, such as ten percent, of total
consumption of the good in the developed country. This would limit the
use of countervailing duties as a protectionist instrument and allow those
LDCs which are relatively new and weak in the market an advantage
over other LDCs which have become rather proficient in marketing the
same product, and which hardly qualify as "less developed" for that good.
This rule does, in fact, have the double advantage of distinguishing
between relatively less and more moderately advanced developing
countries. This is an issue which has caused considerable problems with
the whole concept of differential treatment for developing countries. The
more advanced of them have pressured for differential treatment which is
uniformly applied to all developing countries while the developed
countries have felt that some of the larger, more advanced LDCs have
become competitive in a number of products of a medium level of
technology and do not need special and differential advantages. Thus, the
developed countries have been more resistant to differential treatment
than they would have otherwise. The ten percent rule would provide a
partial compromise to this problem.
The integrity of the ten percent rule could be preserved only through
the adaptation of a related rule which is used in conjunction with it.
11. This norm was used in the escape clause of the United States prior to the
modifications contained in the Trade Act of 1974 § 201. See, e.g., Trade Expansion

Act of 1962, 19 U.S.C. § 1901.
12. ITC, Pub. No. 764, Butadiene Acrylonitrile Rubber from Japan(1976); U.S.
Tariff Commission, Pub. No. 476 Large Power Transformers from France, Italy,
Japan,Switzerland, and United Kingdom (1972); U.S. Tariff Commission, Pub. No.
332 Whole Dried Eggs from Holland (1970); and U.S. Tariff Commission, Pub. No.
265 Pig Iron from East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and the U.S.S.R.
(1968).
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When determining whether the disputed imports are sufficiently large to
cause the requisite injury, the ITC will occasionally accumulate the
individual shares of offending imports of several countries so that their
aggregate market share is sufficiently large to establish causation. 13 This
practice could be modified in the case of developing countries to provide
that the aggregation of developing countries together would not be
permissible in establishing causation. Thus, combining this rule with the
market share requirement, countervailing duties would be applicable to
only developing countries which reached the ten percent of the U.S.
market requirement, and where a developing country is aggregated with a
developed country, duties would be applicable against only the developed
country.
Definition of Domestic Industry
A last element that could create differential treatment is that of the
definition of the domestic industry which is injured. One practice has
been to allow the definition of the domestic industry to be limited to a
regional area under certain circumstances which has the effect of making
it easier to find that "the domestic market" (or "a" domestic market) has
been injured. 14 This definition is applied where the regional market is
isolated from the rest of the national market because of transportation
costs, traditional patterns of distribution or consumer tastes, and where
all the sellers and producers within the regional market sell almost all of
their production in that market, or almost none of the product produced
elsewhere in the country is sold in that regional market. This rule could
be modified in the case of LDCs to require that the segmented, regional
market represent at least twenty-five percent of the market of the
developed country for that good before the special definition could be
applied.
How would the above rules affect the Caribbean Basin countries? The
impact would vary a great deal from country to country. For those
countries which are significantly involved in export promotion, the rules
would be enormously helpful. Within the recent past, several Basin
countries have been pressured into agreeing to the gradual withdrawal of
a number of subsidies granted to goods sent to the United States. A rule
13. Pig Iron from East Germany, supra note 12; ITC, Pub. No. 639 Primary
Lead Metal from Australia and Canada (1974) at 12-13, 22-24.
14. See, e.g., Steel Bars, Reinforcing Bars, and Shapes from Australia, 35 Fed.
Reg. 4,161 (Tariff Comm'n 1970). In this case, the regional market in question
represented only one-half of one percent of U.S. consumption, yet the opinion of the
Commission stated, "In weighing the injury, we have applied the principle that an
injury to a part of the national market is an injury to the whole market."
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requiring a showing that such subsidized imports were the major cause of
serious injury would have put them at a significantly stronger negotiating position relative to the current situation. Of course, a number of Basin
countries, particularly the smaller islands, are still principally exporters
of traditional agricultural goods such as sugar and have little manufacturing activities from which to encourage exportation, thus the rules
would mean little to them in the near future.
These rules, which no doubt would fail to satisfy everyone, offer
several advantages. First, more "pure" economic formulations which
would seek to calculate the amount of the distortion are not administratively practical. There is no sufficient agreement among economists as to
the proper manner in which to calculate the social costs which would be
required, and the data requirements for such calculations make them
somewhat impractical to administer on a product-by-product/country-bycountry basis. Second, an examination of the application of different
injury standards in U.S. trade legislation would, at least, indicate that a
fair amount of differential treatment would be created in favor of LDCs
by these norms.1 5 Third, the rules are cast within the framework of
traditional trade practices of the developed countries which should permit
a reasonable evaluation of their potential impact through the developed
countries' attempt to appraise their political acceptability. Finally, for
developing countries, the rules avoid the very difficult problem of defining
an acceptable versus an unacceptable subsidy practice.
These rules also face some obstacles. First, the trend in the United
States trade field has been to lessen rather than strengthen the injury
requirement. In the area of antidumping rules, the standard has
gradually shifted from showing the equivalent of "material injury" to "de
minimis" injury in addition to a causation requirement of only "de
minimis."' 6 Likewise, the standard for injury under the U.S. escape clause
has been reduced by the 1974 Trade Act. In addition, it now appears that
the United States intends to follow the extremely weak "de minimis" test
in making countervailing duty determinations of duty-free imports as

15. See, e.g., an analysis of their application in, ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN
STATES, GATT Rules and U.S. Law Regarding Export Subsidies and Countervailing Duties, OEA/Ser. H/XIII CIES/CECON-COMERCIO/142 (1977).
16. Compare, U.S. Tariff Commission, Pub. No. 109 Cylinder, Crown, and
Sheet Glass (1963), and U.S. Tariff Commission, Pub. No. 214 Cast Iron Soil From
Poland (1967).
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required under the Trade Act of 1974.17 Second, the developed countries
appear to be backing off significantly from any talk of differential
treatment for developing countries in the current round of trade
negotiations in Geneva. This is particularly unfortunate in this area since
the LDCs have a rather compelling argument for differential treatment in
the area of countervailing duties.

17. ITC, Pub. No. 787 Certain Zoris From the Republic of China (Taiwan)
(1976). In consideration of the 1974 Trade Act, the House Ways and Means
Committee Report clearly stated that it was the intention of the Committee that
the injury requirement for countervailing duties on duty-free imports should be the
equivalent of that applied to antidumping duties where a "de minimis" standard
was in use. The comments of the Senate Finance Committee, however, can be
construed to mean that they expected it to be interpreted so as to be consistent with
the GATT requirement of "material injury." Compare: HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS
AND MEANS, TRADE REFORM ACT OF 1973, H.R. Rep. No. 93-571, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. 74 (1973), and SEN. COMM. ON FINANCE, TRADE REFORM ACT OF 1974, S. Rep.
No. 93-1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 185 (1974).

